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DOI # 2072-...

AD/INT

15 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

FROM : Sayre Stevens  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Scheduling of the Military Estimates

1. We concur in your proposed handling of this year's estimates on Soviet and Chinese military developments, in particular, the proposal for a more limited version of NIE 11-3/8. We are also in general agreement with the procedures which you propose for the handling of military estimates in future years. Having said that, however, we would note that the length and level of detail of these estimates are central to the question of how many of them we will be able to produce each fall. If the senior policymakers agree to a reduction in the length of these NIEs down to a Key Judgments and consolidated estimate (akin to Volume I of NIE 11-3/8), rather than a multivolume, in-depth presentation, then we should be able to redo or revalidate each of the six "basic" estimates each fall. Contentious issues or other matters requiring more detailed treatment could be handled in annexes or in separately produced IIMs or SNIEs, done at a different time of the year.

2. Realistically, I think we need to recognize that revalidation of the estimates will rarely take the form of a simple statement to the effect that the Community generally supports the Key Judgments of the existing estimate. The process more likely will require complete review and extensive revision but, hopefully, not a complete redo of the existing estimate. Nonetheless, if we commit ourselves to completely

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redoing no more than three of the proposed six estimates each year, and if our prime consumers agree to shorter estimates, then I think we in the DDI at least will be able to handle annual production or revalidation of all six, in addition to periodic redos (at a different time of the year) of other estimates on such subjects as the Soviet Navy, Strategic Forces for Peripheral Attack, and Military Research and Development. As you know, papers on these latter subjects have, in the past, proven to be as time consuming and painstaking as the more basic estimates.

3. I should point out that in considering our ability to support the estimates production schedule which you propose, we assumed that CIA would not be involved in the coordination or validation of the DIPP. With production or revalidation of at least six military estimates each year, DDI resources would be spread unacceptably thin if we also had to coordinate or participate in "national validation" of the DIPP. Such a combined effort would require a significant re-ordering of priorities within the DDI components involved.

4. In sum, our ability to produce the estimates you propose rests on:

- a. doing no more than three of these estimates in full each fall;
- b. being able to return to a shorter format for all of the military estimates; and
- c. having DIA prepare and produce the DIPP, without CIA participation.

5. More specific comments on your draft memorandum are attached.

SAYRE STEVENS

Attachment:  
As Stated

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DDI Comments on DDCI/NI Draft Memorandum  
of 6 June 1977, The Military  
Estimates

- Para 3: We would delete the reference to 11-4 here, since we agree with the judgment in paragraph 10 that this estimate will not need to be done annually.
- Para 9: It is not clear what is meant by a "cross-referencing device".
- Para 10: The suggested title for NIE 11-4 is perhaps too broad for a document dealing primarily with Soviet military policy and strategy.
- Para 10: We doubt that very much of the content of 11-4 will "remain unchanged for decades". In the last sentence, perceived changes in Soviet policy should drive the scope and frequency of 11-4 at least as much as should the needs of US policy.
- Para 13: The fourth sentence might better read: "Because of resource limitations, it will be feasible to produce no more than three of these in full in any one year."

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